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On  17 May 2020, the television channel Russia-1 aired a short interview 
with Vladimir Putin, where he stressed the need to use new technology, 
genetics and artificial intelligence included, in order to preserve and pro-
tect Russia. Furthermore, Putin connected the capability for technologi-
cal innovation to Russia’s position as a “separate civilization” of numerous 
ancient traditions: Россия — это не просто страна, это действительно 
отдельная цивилизация: это многонациональная страна с большим 
количеством традиций, культур, вероисповеданий (Russia.tv 2020).1 
The interview was aired as part of the weekly program “Moscow. 
Kremlin. Putin,” which that evening focused on the development of 
national industry (aircraft construction in particular). However, the 
interview was actually made eight months earlier, in September 2019. 
Remarking on this use of stored-up material, commentator Ilya Klishin 
described it as an example of “canned goods” or “preserves,” which “has 
become a familiar part of Russia’s postmodern political landscape.” The 
decision to air this interview at this moment, with the president describ-
ing Russia as a “separate civilization,” Klishin explains, was to assure 
Russian citizens that the state will protect them in the coronavirus situ-
ation. While characterizing Russian authorities in quite cynical terms, 
Klishin admitted that Russian society is not opposed to ideas about the 
country’s alleged uniqueness:
1 “Russia is not only a country, it is a separate civilization; it is a multinational country 
with a great number of traditions, cultures, confessions.”
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It is important to note that even if the average Russian understands 
that the authorities are “going heavy on the patriotism” and filling the 
airwaves with empty statements about a “distinct civilization,” it does 
not mean that people basically disagree with that idea. (Klishin 2020)
Klishin’s remark suggests that the Kremlin is currently putting into cir-
culation ideas that, however instrumentally they are used, also resonate 
with perceptions actively held by a broader public. In this chapter I pur-
sue this idea of a resonance between the authorities and society in Russia, 
or what Samuel Greene and Graeme Robertson have conceptualized as 
the co-construction of power under Putin. While the current regime is 
authoritarian, it also derives legitimacy from popular support. At the 
same time, “Putin’s reliance on popular support also makes him vulner-
able” (Greene & Robertson 2019, 13), since such support may disappear. 
As Viacheslav Morozov and Elena Pavlova have recently argued, even in 
contemporary Russia, with its presumably conservative two-third ma-
jority and the pressure of the Kremlin’s authoritarianism, propaganda 
and manipulation, there is an “ever-existing possibility of alternative he-
gemonic articulations” (Morozov & Pavlova 2020, 7).2 They find their 
hypothesis confirmed by contemporary Russian women’s popular fic-
tion, whose discourse ranges from the traditionalist and patriotic to the 
Eurocentric and oppositional.
Approaching Civilizationism
Scholars emphasize from time to time the pragmatic, non-ideological na-
ture of the Putin regime. Victor Shnirelman, for one, argues that “Putin 
uses the notion of ‘civilization’ instrumentally to justify particular in-
terests” (Shnirelman 2020, 73). “Interests” here mean above all state in-
terests, without a deeper conceptual fundament. However, despite the 
inconsistencies that Shnirelman meticulously documents, I do not neces-
sarily subscribe to the view that the Kremlin’s talk about Russia as a “sep-
arate civilization” is empty (cf. Klishin), if such a statement is taken to 
mean that the people in power do not believe in it or use it just cynically 
to remain in power, or that it has no meaning at all. As for Putin himself 
2 The relatively persistent support of Putin by two-thirds of Russian society is regularly 
documented by the Levada Centre, as also referenced in Morozov and Pavlova’s arti-
cle (Levada Centre n.d.).
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he has explicitly connected the idea of civilization to the Russian state 
and there is little doubt that the current president strongly identifies with 
Russia precisely as a state, an idea he has returned to over and over again 
since he took over as president in late 1999 (Putin 1999).3 “Civilization” 
for Putin is a means to positively articulate Russia’s imperial legacy and 
multinational character — within a unified state. As for society and the 
broader public, however, the appeal of “civilization,” which is a concept 
of multiple meanings indeed, may be connected to Russia, and even to 
the Russian state, but it may also take on other meanings. The aim of this 
chapter is to explore further the multiple meanings and trajectories of 
society’s response.
Citing the sociologist Lev Gudkov, Greene and Robertson argue that 
the current consensus supporting the current regime is maintained in a 
wide range of institutions: the military, schools, church, and of course 
media (Greene and Robertson 2019, 210–211). My analysis below will ex-
plore another venue that contributes to this consensus: academia. Surely, 
academic institutions may not be as instrumental as those mentioned 
above in fostering patriotism. Contemporary Russian academia is also 
an arena for critical debate and even opposition, and more generally a 
too heterogeneous phenomenon to make simple generalizations about, 
consisting as it does of traditional Soviet institutions alongside those that 
evolved later, from above as well as from below.4 Nevertheless, a signifi-
cant part of Russian academia, be it individual members or entire in-
stitutions, has for a long time been a producer of patriotic sentiment. It 
both draws on official rhetoric and has been a source for it. Arguably, it 
provides an illustrative example of what Greene and Robertson describe 
as the co-construction of power.5
3 Putin’s statism has been explored by numerous scholars over the last two decades, 
and there is a widely shared consensus that this makes up the core of “Putinism.” See 
for instance Taylor (2018).
4 It should be noted that academic freedom in Russia has recently experienced some 
setbacks. During 2020 the Higher School of Economics took measures to limit po-
litical activism among students and staff, the background being the 2019 protests 
against election fraud in Moscow (Kaczmarska & Dubrovsky 2020). In October local 
prosecutors required the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and 
Public Administration to report student and staff participation in demonstrations as 
well as their foreign contacts, including “pro-American groups of influence” (Human 
Rights Watch 2020). The attempt was later disavowed.
5 On academia as a producer of regime-supporting ideas, see Suslov & Kotkina (2020), 
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In the following, I examine recent Russian articulations of civiliza-
tionism in a sphere situated outside and yet in several ways related to state 
power.6 How is the meaning of civilization negotiated in academic dis-
course, as exemplified by the activities of two major institutions, which 
I analyse below? What I am particularly interested in is the interaction 
with official ideologemes, or the key units of discourse,7 which in my 
understanding corresponds to what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe 
(2001) conceptualize as the nodal points of discourse, that is particular 
concepts (or “moments”) that gain a privileged status in relation to oth-
er concepts. The goal of the discursive process as described by Laclau 
and Mouffe is the fixation of meaning by creating and connecting such 
nodal points. However, as they point out, “every nodal point is consti-
tuted within an intertextuality that overflows it” (Laclau & Mouffe 2001, 
100). This is a precondition for articulation, and it is their view that a full 
closure of meaning, without any ambiguity, cannot really be achieved, 
though the articulatory practices seek to do so.
It should be noted that there exists a variety of civilizationisms in 
contemporary Russia, which are partially overlapping. As for articula-
tions by elite groups (politicians, public intellectuals), the most impor-
tant ideas are those of Russia as a separate civilization, as in the quote 
from Putin presented at the outset and in the material examined below, 
and of Russia as the truly European civilization defending “traditional 
Christian values.”8 Civilizational thinking entered Russian debates be-
fore contemporary populism (cf. Brubaker 2017) and even before Samuel 
Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis, though it was significantly in-
fluenced by it, having first been shaped by the ideas of Nikolai Danilevskii, 
Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee. Indeed, the division of the world 
into separate, distinct civilizations, often for ideological rather than 
scholarly purposes (Horovun 2016), was evoked in response to the late- 
who analyse civilizational rhetoric in doctoral dissertations of the past 20 years.
6 “Civilizationism” is adopted from Brubaker (2017). Brubaker focuses in particular on 
contemporary right-wing populism and its ideas about “identitarian Christianity” 
as a community broader and yet complementary to the nation. In the case of Russia, 
however, civilization and nation are widely associated with one another.
7 For a discussion of “ideologeme,” see Turoma & Mjør (2020).
8 For the second type, which is more recent, see Engström (2014; 2020), Laruelle 
(2016), Riabova (2020), Zvereva (2020). These two understandings are inconsist-
ently pursued by the very same actors — Putin included. 
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and early post-Soviet changes (Turoma & Mjør 2020). Yet it entered a 
new stage during Putin’s third presidency, a period known also for its 
conservative turn. Having earlier been promoted by public intellectuals 
and politicians of various factions, by the Russian Orthodox Church, and 
by new post-Soviet academic disciplines, most notably culture studies 
(kul’turologiia, Scherrer 2003) but also “geopolitics” (cf. Suslov 2013) and 
“politology,” civilizationism has during the last decade become a vocal 
part of official rhetoric. The official turn to civilizationism came to ex-
pression in Vladimir Putin’s texts and speeches of 2012–2013, and has 
subsequently been applied as a framework in several policy documents 
and law initiatives related to foreign policy (2013, see Linde 2016) and to 
cultural policy (2014, see Turoma & Mjør 2020).
By implication, the notion of Russia as forming a civilization of its 
own has been actively adopted by the authorities from various segments 
of society. Particularly illuminating is the concept of a “state-civilization” 
(gosudarstvo-tsivilizatsiia), which had been coined some years prior to 
the Kremlin’s appropriation (cf. Putin 2012) by conservative figures such 
as Mikhail Leont’ev and Mikhail Remizov (see Mjør 2018). Below I will 
examine this concept as a case of how civilizationism during the last dec-
ade has been returning to society, that is, how society, as exemplified by 
two departments at Moscow State University and the Russian Academy 
of Sciences, has responded to the authorities’ appropriation of civiliza-
tional rhetoric.
The Panarin Readings (Moscow State University)
Aleksandr Panarin (1940–2003) was professor of political philosophy 
at Moscow State University. Having been a dissident in the late Soviet 
Union and a proponent of liberalism during perestroika and the early 
1990s, he gradually shifted position as he witnessed the results of the 
reforms as well as Russia’s reduced standing internationally. He emerged 
as a fierce critic of globalization and Westernization, seeing them as pro-
cesses leading to poverty and to loss of diversity and cultural identity, and 
turning Russia into a devastated “fourth world.” At the same time, he for-
mulated a utopian vision for how diversity and identity could be restored. 
This would be a global struggle where Russia — for him the most appar-
ent victim of globalization — would take the lead in a spiritual revolt. He 
grounded his claim in recent experiences of globalization, in Russia’s 
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cultural heritage as a multi-ethnic and yet Orthodox civilization and in 
ideas of compassion and altruism as formulated by Russian thinkers of 
the past (Panarin 2002). Thus, while rejecting Western claims to univer-
salism, which were rather expressions of Western particularism, Panarin 
proposed another idea of true universalism and pluralism, for which 
Russia and its civilization — its experiences and hidden potential — was 
the best model available. Russia’s mission was to preserve its own, true 
identity and represent a prototype for others.
Panarin passed away in 2003, and the conference series “Panarin 
readings” has been arranged annually since 2004 with the aim of pre-
serving his legacy. The last conference by the time of writing this chap-
ter was held at Moscow State University in November 2019 on the occa-
sion of the 150th anniversary of Nikolai Danilevskii’s book Russia and 
Europe (1869), the title being “Russia and Europe: Common Destiny and 
Alternative Projects of Civilizational Developments.” Proceedings are 
regularly published as separate volumes. For the last years, the main or-
ganizer has been the Department of the Philosophy of Politics and Law 
at the Philosophical Faculty of Moscow State University, in collaboration 
with the Likhachev Research Institute for Cultural and Natural Heritage 
and Moscow State Linguistic University, but the readings also involve col-
laboration with a wide range of partners — from the political party Just 
Russia (its leader Sergei Mironov is a regular speaker at the conferences) 
via the Academy of Sciences’ Council for the Study and Preservation of 
Cultural and Natural Heritage to the World Russian People’s Council of 
the Russian Orthodox Church. The two central figures, judging from the 
last decade’s conferences and publications, have been Valerii Rastorguev 
and Evgenii Chelyshev. Chelyshev, who passed away in July 2020, had 
been a high-ranking academic (Indologist and scholar of literary and cul-
tural studies) in the Soviet and post-Soviet system, as well as a veteran and 
public figure. Since 1992 he was the leader of the Academy of Sciences’ 
Scientific Council for Cultural and Natural Heritage, and since 2012 of 
the research programme “Russia’s Civilizational Path” (r a n  2016).9
9 The programme “Russia’s Civilizational Path” has been a collaboration between the 
Academy of Sciences and the World Russian People’s Council of the Russian Ortho-
dox Church. A recent collective monograph summing up the project — Russia’s Civi-
lizational Development: Heritage, Potential, Perspectives (Chereshnev & Rastorguev 
2018) — generally shares the same features as those encountered in other publications 
discussed in this chapter, but identifies civilization first and foremost with confes-
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The first proceedings that were published after the Kremlin’s deci-
sive turn to civilizationism was the book Russia’s Civilizational Mission 
(Rastorguev 2014), which is based on the ninth readings in 2012/2013 
(the volume confusingly gives both years). In general the concept of “mis-
sion” figures prominently in the civilizational discourse without neces-
sarily being defined, but its meaning as it appears from this volume, for 
instance according to the papers by Vladimir Mironov (2014) and Sergei 
Mironov (2014), is to meet the challenges of globalization by maintain-
ing the alleged Russian tradition of a peaceful building of a multinational 
state as a sound alternative to them. For Sergei Mironov, Russia’s “mis-
sion” is the unification of peoples — it is both an idea promoted by phi-
losophers of the past as an ideal and an alleged fact of Russian imperial 
history. In the civilizational discourse, thus, the Soviet notion of Russian 
history as the “friendship of peoples” has re-emerged as an ideologeme, 
in particular after Putin’s text on the national question (2012).10 Sergei 
Mironov (2014, 22) favourably approves of Putin’s use of “state-civiliza-
tion,” claiming that this “new language” gives more place for culture and 
humanitarian ideas and not just the state. Mironov and his Just Russia 
are a central part of Russia’s loyal, “systemic opposition” (Reuter 2019, 
48), and he clearly approves of Putin’s ideas, while emphasizing the need 
for a vital society in Russia and not just a strong state.
An even clearer reflection of official ideas can be found in the pro-
ceedings from the tenth Panarin readings that took place in 2015, which 
bear the very title Russia as a State-Civilization (Rastorguev ed. 2016). 
Chelyshev’s contribution (2016) focuses on the need for new kinds of 
self-articulation in shifting and unstable times, for which the concept of 
“state-civilization” comes in neatly. Chelyshev claims that it places Russia 
in the same category as China, India, Japan and Iran, an idea that during 
the last decade has been frequently articulated in the civilizational dis-
course, where these civilizations figure as the warrant of cultural diver-
sity. A “state-civilization” is, for Chelyshev, defined by a common faith, 
a strong state and a common linguistic space (“the Russian World”); the 
sion, not state (Chereshnev & Rastorguev 2018, 24).
10 Prior to Putin’s text on the “national question” the theme of Russia’s multi-ethnicity 
featured prominently in public discourse, for instance in Tikhon Shevkunov’s popu-
lar t v  film The Fall of an Empire: Lessons from Byzantium and Maksim Shevchenko’s 
journalism (Yablokov 2018, 42, 97). 
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latter being a central topic in Chelyshev’s writings, which often focus on 
the threat of disintegration posed by smaller languages gaining rights. As 
for confessions, Russia possesses an Orthodox identity while still being 
“tolerant” vis-à-vis other confessions within this civilization. Again we 
encounter the dissemination of an idealized, harmonious understand-
ing of Russian imperial history as diversity in unity, which dates back to 
late imperial and Soviet history but is hereby recast in the civilizational 
language.
Rastorguev’s chapter in Russia as a State-Civilization, too, opens with 
a definition of “state-civilization,” which shares major similarities with 
that of Chelyshev. For Rastorguev the term is particularly applicable to 
Russia due to its size (“the largest country in the world”), its resources, 
ethnic diversity and unique experiences of handling this diversity in a 
peaceful manner. For Rastorguev the “mission” is simply to be a civiliza-
tion, a “predetermination” that seems to be related to geography through 
his use of Lev Gumilev’s concept of “niche,” which refers to the interac-
tion of an ethnic group with its natural surroundings (Rastorguev 2016, 
50). What Rastorguev’s chapter in particular illustrates, however, is the 
ways in which it puts on display the production of civilizational discourse 
as a means to itself. In his conclusion, he reminds his readers that the 
Panarin readings, which are devoted to the civilization theme, aim at rec-
ognizing Russia’s civilizational mission and thus preserving it as a civi-
lization. In other words, to talk about Russia as a civilization becomes 
a way to maintaining it as such. Moreover, Rastorguev stresses some 
key methodological principles in this respect, the central being to focus 
on unity: of nature and culture; state and religion; language and values 
(Rastorguev 2018, 71–72). But unity is in this context necessarily an as-
sumption, not a finding, and hence a discursive product. Rastorguev’s 
text thus becomes a neat example of academic research as the produc-
tion of discourse in terms of the combination of nodal points (concepts, 
ideas): state, geography, culture, religion — all of which are understood as 
a unity, while unity is taken to mean that it is a civilization.
Likewise, in the foreword to the last volume of proceedings from the 
Panarin readings so far, Rastorguev states that what unites all contribu-
tions to the readings is precisely the civilizational approach. For him 
this is a source of optimism, since this paradigm is otherwise repudiated 
among analysts. Rastorguev frames the project he conducts as a discur-
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sive struggle, that is, as a struggle to make a particular perspective he-
gemonic (Rastorguev 2018, 7–8).
Ironically, however, the understanding of Russia as a civilization en-
countered in these volumes is hardly ever based on new research but, at 
best, on a small selection of accounts produced in historically different 
situations and contexts, to which they responded. Although references 
are generally few, the foundational text in the material examined here 
is Nikolai Danilevskii’s Russia and Europe (see e.g. Rastorguev 2016; 
Chereshnev & Rastorguev 2018). What is noteworthy in this respect 
is not only that this is a speculative work which was written in an al-
ready then outdated biological language (and which these contemporary 
scholars unequivocally accept as nauka), but also that it is a work that 
so clearly bears the marks of the age of reform (abolition of serfdom, lo-
cal governance) in which it was written. Russian-Slavic civilization was 
for Danilevskii not a historical fact, not a “heritage,” but a project for 
the future. While he saw Russia as “predetermined” to accomplish it, the 
project was also dependent on agency (Mjør 2016), and this is mostly 
absent in contemporary treatments of Danilevskii,11 which sees “mission” 
in terms of preservation of an imaginary past only. In Rastorguev’s own 
defence of the civilizational approach, which is formulated in the politi-
cal language of Putin’s Russia, Danilevskii’s model enables the preserva-
tion of cultural heritage and national sovereignty (Rastorguev 2018, 18).12
The Russian Project of Civilizational Development (Academy of Sciences)
Two other contributors to the 2016 Russia as a State-Civilization vol-
ume discussed above were Valeriia Spiridonova and Rimma Sokolova, 
affiliated with the Department of the Philosophical Problems of Politics, 
which belongs to the Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of 
Sciences. And actually, in the same year of 2016 they too published an 
academic work by the same title — Russia as a State-Civilization, a collec-
tive monograph co-authored with Vladimir Shevchenko. 2016 was also 
the year when “The Russian Project of Civilizational Development” was 
11 For an exception, see Smirnov (2019, 116–50), who emphasizes that Danilevskii’s 
Slavic civilization belonged to the future. However, he fully accepts Danilevskii’s 
civilizational division of the world, including its firm border between Russia and the 
West and the impossibility of adopting foreign cultural models.
12 On sovereignty and its role in contemporary Russia’s political discourse, see Jardar 
Østbø’s contribution to this volume. 
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accepted by the Scientific-Coordinating Council of the Federal Agency 
of Scientific Organizations (fa no).13 It is currently one of the Institute 
of Philosophy’s “plan themes” (Institut filosofii r a n  2019c) and is di-
rected by the Institute’s director, Andrei Smirnov, who is also head of 
the Department for the Philosophy of the Islamic World, president of 
the Russian Philosophical Society and primarily a specialist in Arabic-
Muslim philosophy. The book by Spiridonova, Sokolova and Shevchenko, 
Russia as a State-Civilization, arguably formulates a set of premises for 
the project. Except perhaps for the cover illustration — a photo of the nu-
clear-powered icebreaker Russia — it is a typical r a n  publication in terms 
of design and low print-run. Still, as also increasingly characteristic of 
Russian academic publications it is openly accessible on the institute’s 
website and has a potentially broad outreach.
The introduction written by Shevchenko demonstrates a quite mani-
fest fusion of political and academic prose. The fall of the Soviet Union, we 
read, led to the hegemony of one ideology — Western liberalism — which 
left Russia uncertain of its own identity. At present, however, Russia has 
entered a new stage: It is no longer a “state controlled by the West” and 
is currently “gaining political independence” (Spiridonova, Sokolova & 
Shevchenko 2016, 7). “Independence” means to regain its role as a “state-
civilization,” which is repeatedly opposed to “nation-state.” While the 
nation-state is seen as a “Western” concept that was imposed on Russia 
in the 1990s and threatened its sovereignty, “state-civilization” stands 
for Russia’s quintessential nature. “State-civilization” legitimizes Russia’s 
imperial legacy and places it on a par with China and India. Thus, the 
book sustains the othering of the West so characteristic of Russian iden-
tity formation since the 19th century at least, while actively identifying 
Russia with other non-Western countries, which is a more recent phe-
nomenon in this respect.
The language encountered in this and similar publications often has 
a ritualized and even redundant character, where it for instance is highly 
unclear whether it was the state that created Russian civilization or the 
other way around. This tendency testifies to the performative charac-
ter (cf. Yurchak 2006) of ideologized discourse, where the production 
13 See Biotekh2030 (2016). The original web page of fa no  no longer exists; in 2018, 
fa no  was closed down and its activity was taken over by the Ministry of Science and 
Higher Education of the Russian Federation.
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of civilizational talk appears as a means to itself, at the expense of his-
torical references. However, Russian academic prose that explicitly sup-
ports current Russian politics does not merely reproduce its language. 
Sokolova’s chapter, which takes issue with the challenges of globalization, 
places quotations from Putin in the context of other Russian thinkers 
from Nikolai Danilevskii (whose ideas she actually compares to Putin’s) 
to Mikhail Remizov. She is particularly concerned with what Russian 
thought (otechestvennaia mysl’) has to offer to the conceptualization of 
Russia as (state-) civilization and how it may serve as a weapon to coun-
ter globalization and defend Russia’s own interests. While Sokolova’s 
writing is on the one hand informed by official ideologemes such as the 
Russian nation and culture being the “core” (sterzhen) of Russian civili-
zation (cf Putin 2012),14 the “power vertical,” “unity” and Russia’s “thou-
sand-year experience” (cf. Mjør 2020), she combines them with notions 
developed in the history of Russian thought, such as Gumilev’s “behav-
ioral stereotype,” and classical Eurasianism’s “ideocracy” (Spiridonova, 
Sokolova & Shevchenko 2016, 45–55). Similar to Rastorguev above, 
Sokolova provides additional ideas and concepts which in this particular 
case hardly challenge the hegemonic discourse but which may or may 
not be approved by other producers, in a context where to supply offi-
cial, conservative ideology with ideas and references from the history of 
Russian thought during the last decade has been a central effort of several 
think tanks (cf. Laruelle 2016, 288–89).
In other cases, however, we encounter perspectives that more explic-
itly challenge official articulations. In the course of 2019 and first half of 
2020 the Institute of Philosophy organized three conferences; the first 
two were entitled “Philosophy and the Civilizational Future of Russia” 
(May, November 2019), while the third bore the title “The Civilizational 
Development of Contemporary Russia: A Philosophical Perspective 
(June, 2020).15 The last conference, which due to the coronavirus situa-
tion was an online event without any discussion after the paper presenta-
14 In formulations like these, “Russian civilization” is normally rossiiskaia, while “Rus-
sian culture / nation” is russkaia. Sokolova, still, uses the rather uncommon russko-
rossiiskaia tsivilizatsiia, which I take to mean a multi-ethnic state-civilization forged 
by the ethnically Russian people (Spiridonova, Sokolova and Shevchenko 2016, 54).
15 All are available on YouTube, though not in their entirety due to technical issues 
(Institut filosofii r a n  2019a, 2019b, 2020).
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tions, illustrates their heterogeneous character, without questioning the 
civilizational approach as such.
Shevchenko’s talk “Russia returns to itself: The problem of choosing 
a civilizational future,” which opened the second conference, was very 
much swept in the official discourse. According to Shevchenko, we are 
currently proceeding from a unipolar to a multipolar world; whereby 
Russia is liberating itself from its former “neo-colonial dependency” 
on the West, rediscovering its own cultural heritage and acquiring in-
dependence. Citing the interview Putin gave to the Financial Times in 
2019, where he famously claimed that the “liberal idea has become ob-
solete,” Shevchenko maintains that Western Europe is no longer worthy 
of imitation. Instead, Russia is currently articulating its “civilizational 
sovereignty.”
Whereas this talk in November 2019 had a highly affirmative char-
acter and recycled several official ideologemes, Shevchenko’s appearance 
at the conference in June 2020 took a somewhat different turn, despite a 
title very much in line with the main tendencies revealed so far: “Russia’s 
Historical Mission and the Civilizational Project of the 21st Century.” 
Russia’s mission, according to Shevchenko, is internally to rely on its his-
torical experience of creating an ethnically harmonious country, and ex-
ternally, in foreign policy, to preserve multipolarity.16 He went on to cite 
the Just Russia programme (Sergei Mironov appeared at this conference 
as well, his talk being devoted to Russia’s “separate path”), saying that 
culture is the fundament for state-building. However, he proceeded to 
accentuate необходимость преодоление разрыва между огромным 
духовным богатством русской культуры, культуры других наро-
дов страны и сравнительно бедным, недостроенным, далеко не со-
вершенным характером русской цивилизации (Institut filosofii r a n 
2020, 2:50:10).17 Alluding to a classical German/Spenglerian distinc-
tion between culture and civilization, Shevchenko made the claim that 
“Russian civilization” does by no means yet match “Russian culture.” By 
“civilization” here Shevchenko obviously does not mean the “state-civi-
16 In 2018, the same author collective published a new collective monograph, devoted 
to the theme of “multipolarity” (Shevchenko, Spiridonova & Sokolova 2018).
17 “The necessity to overcome the rift between the enormous spiritual wealth of Russian 
culture, of the culture of the country’s other peoples, and the relatively poor, unful-
filled, by far incomplete character of Russian civilization.”
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lization” (empire, multi-ethnic country etc.) but rather “civilized char-
acter,” the norms of behaviour in everyday life and so on. Shevchenko 
ended his talk by stressing the need for a civilizing mission to combat 
barbarism. In the end, civilization as used by Shevchenko came closer to 
what Norbert Elias has described as the civilizing process rather than a 
synonym for a mighty state.
Thus, despite his affirmation of official discourse (multi-ethnic unity, 
multipolar world), Shevchenko also implicitly challenged the belief in 
the absolute primacy of the state, known in Russian as gosudarstvenni-
chestvo. Shevchenko clearly believes in the idea of Russian civilization but 
his talk disconnected it from the state. Rather, it cannot be realized with-
out activating ideas articulated by past thinkers, representing “Russian 
culture.” A truly realized Russian civilization thus becomes a project 
for the future rather than the thousand-year-old state. Shevchenko was 
here in line with another speaker at the third conference (and regular 
contributor to the events and publications discussed in this chapter), 
Aleksei Kozyrev of Moscow State University. Asking what characterizes 
the “spirit of our times,” Kozyrev emphasized the heavy presence of “civil 
religion” at the expense of traditional Orthodoxy. “Civil religion” is for 
Kozyrev exemplified, among other things, by the new cathedral of the 
Russian armed forces that was opened on 22 June 2020 or the “immortal 
regiment” events. However, in Kozyrev’s view, these manifestations are 
not the true Orthodox tradition but its “simulacra” (Institut filosofii r a n 
2020, 1:23:30).18 He concluded his talk by emphasizing the importance of 
intellectuals in order to defeat the “spirit of our times.” The implication 
here too was that Russian civilization remains a future project, for which 
it is essential to rediscover the real traditions, above all that of Russian 
thought, whose legacy Kozyrev described as more or less absent.
In general, the r a n  project aims at showing the relevance of the 
Russian philosophical tradition (Slavophilism, Eurasianism and other 
currents) for Russia’s “civilizational development,” and as the papers 
by Kozyrev and Shevchenko aim to show, philosophy is indispensable 
in this respect. This brings us to the journal connected to this project, 
Civilization Studies Review (main editor: Shevchenko, two issues pub-
18 Another tendency characterizing the “spirit of our times” according to Kozyrev was 
the disintegrating impact of “multiculturalism” — which is very much in line with 
Putin (2012). See also Civstudies (2019). 
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lished so far), whose contributions mostly apply the civilizational ap-
proach to the history of ideas and religion in order to show the current 
relevance of past ideas, at times with explicit reference to the political 
vocabulary, for instance by emphasizing Russia’s “civilizational sover-
eignty” (cf. Darenskii 2020, 50). The first issue was opened by a conver-
sation between Shevchenko and Smirnov, and according to the latter, in 
Danilevskii “we possess an enormous resource of thought (myslitel’nyi 
resurs), on which we must build and should develop further” (Civstudies 
2019, 13).
However, the journal is also open to critical perspectives, even on 
the “Russian project for civilizational development” itself. The article by 
Evgenii Tiugashev and Iurii Popkov (2020) criticizes the project’s con-
ceptual vagueness, inconsistencies and contradictions. They even point 
to an “eschatological flavor” (эсхатологический привкус) contained in 
it, while connecting the alleged need for a civilizational project to the “ro-
tation and migration [after descending from power, kjm] of elites” (2020, 
42), thus implicitly questioning the whole rationale of the project. They 
also criticize the harmonic understanding of Russian imperial history, 
which they argue should rather be understood as colonization. Finally, 
“Russian civilization” is for the authors not a separate civilization, but 
a typical borderland civilization (as are most civilizations) made up of 
various traditions: Orthodox, Eurasian, European, Slavic, ethnically 
Russian etc. They conclude by arguing that the project should rather fo-
cus on the “civilizational foundations” (in keeping with the understand-
ing above) of Russian philosophy and explore Russia’s place in world phi-
losophy, instead of approaching it as an isolated project. They call for 
framing Russian thought as a contribution to what they conceptualize as 
“such ‘cooperative’ constructs as u n  philosophy or u n esco  philosophy” 
(Tiugashev & Iurii Popkov 2020, 45) and hence to universal goals of sus-
tainable development.
Tiugashev and Popkov conduct their discussion within a civilization-
al framework but otherwise question most of the assumptions shared and 
actively promoted by other contributors as discussed in this chapter. They 
make up a rare case in this context. The other examples discussed here 
are much more in conformity with the official view, meaning Putinist 
understandings of the Russian past and present as the history of a sover-
eign state-civilization (or empire) of a diverse and yet unified character.
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Conclusions
Putin’s statement aired in 2020 that Russia possesses “a great number 
of traditions, cultures, confessions” — and this was not the first time he 
uttered an idea like this — may be read as a call to excavate Russia’s civ-
ilizational heritage. The projects discussed in this chapter are obvious 
examples of society’s positive, affirmative responses to official ideology. 
As I have shown, they contribute to the reproduction of the hegemonic 
discourse in terms of rhetoric and themes (anti-globalization, anti-West-
ernism, defence of imperial legacy). However, even the apparently apolo-
getic texts, while seeking to connect with official projects of state build-
ing and international positioning, retrieve from the past ideas that may 
support current political goals, but which are just as capable of casting a 
critical light on contemporary Russia.
Still, the question arises whether the firm belief in Russia as a “dis-
tinct civilization” that we witness in scholarly writing and academic seg-
ments is held by a broader public. A recent study of civilizational orienta-
tions among “ordinary people” (Hale & Laruelle 2020) suggests that this 
is not necessarily so. According to the study’s data from 2013 and 2014, 
the belief that Russia is a distinct civilization is shared by one third of the 
Russian population, that is about half of those persistently supporting 
the current regime. Moreover, this assumption is unevenly shared across 
generations: “the older people are, the more likely they are to identify 
Russia as a distinct stand-alone civilization, while the younger they are, 
the more likely they are to identify Russian with European civilization” 
(Hale & Laruelle 2020, 595). In addition, gender plays a role: women are 
more likely to identify Russia with Europe than men are.
In Hale and Laruelle’s view, their findings, where a majority dem-
onstrates broader, more flexible civilizational identities than merely 
their own country, imply a rejection of the essentialist categories of 
“Huntingtonian primordialism.” In my understanding of the usages they 
document, it is the identification of one’s civilization as something broad-
er than one’s country that in particular demonstrates the non-essentialist 
character of civilizational belonging, while the more essentialist notion 
of a “Russian civilization” (though this too is always rossiiskaia) is merely 
one option among several, and perhaps also one that does not necessarily 
have a viable future. 
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Yet Hale and Laruelle too, when surveying the civilizational discourse 
of Russia’s leadership, observe that the term “Russian civilization” has 
been increasingly used since 2013, “no longer primarily for comparison 
but now as a way of emphasizing that Russia has a distinct value system of 
its own” (Hale & Laruelle 2020, 591). Meanwhile, the case study carried 
out in this chapter has explored how academic segments, arguably con-
servative ones, have responded to the civilizationism of the conservative 
turn. Here we witness the positioning of Russia in opposition to the West 
and a corresponding identification with Eastern “state-civilizations.” In 
light of Hale and Laruelle’s study, this tendency is at odds with the beliefs 
of the broader public. In academic civilizationism we see few if any at-
tempts to question the very idea of Russia as a separate civilization, or the 
analytical or political value of the concept. There are also few attempts to 
present Russia as the truly European Christian civilization, a belief that is 
otherwise widely shared in political conservative circles, the Kremlin in-
cluded (cf. Putin’s 2013 Valdai Speech as cited in Laruelle 2016). The kind 
of civilizationism examined in this chapter is predominantly oriented to-
wards Russia as a “state-civilization” and Russia as a set of culture and 
ideas, quite consistently opposed in a Danilevskian fashion to the West.
A marked tendency in the material explored in this chapter is the 
maintaining and recycling of commonplaces about Russia, instead of an-
alysing or theorizing. However, given the fuzzy nature of civilization, a 
concept that is known for having a multitude of meanings and uses, alter-
native significations are likely to emerge. Above, we have seen that such 
notions might be civilization in terms of cultivation (cf. Norbert Elias’ 
classical study) or a domain inferior to culture (known as the “German 
tradition”). Moreover, we have also witnessed uncertainty as to whether 
civilization is of the past, present or future. All these ambiguities inevita-
bly create tensions in what is otherwise a seemingly uniform, reproduc-
tive discourse. Thus, at the turn of a new decade, Russian civilizationism, 
while apparently hegemonic and approved by top institutions, is poten-
tially destabilized both by tensions within the discourse and by other, 
more flexible civilizational identifications shared by the broader public.19
19 Another recent analysis based on surveys made in 2014–2016 also suggests that 
“more elaborate ideological versions of ‘Russia as a state-civilization’ did not resonate 
with respondents” and that “this lack of deeper articulation will reduce the mobiliz-
ing appeal and long-term viability of the ‘state-civilization’ narrative” (Blackburn 
2020, 15). 
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